


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4 April 1956

*Received
17 April 56*

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Draft Reply to [redacted] re Soviet
Attacks on Stalin

25X1

Attached is the draft of a reply to the note from [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] n Soviet Attacks on Stalin dated 22 March.

25X1



25X1

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director, Plans

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Dear

25X1

Your note of 22 March with the brief on Soviet Attacks on Stalin was greatly appreciated. Your thinking corresponds closely to our interpretation. Some of our experts who have been watching current developments raise a few additional problems in the enclosure. Your comments will be very welcome.

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Comments on Soviet Attacks on Stalin

In the wake of the Stalin purge a number of additional problems have come to occupy our attention:

- a) How far will the Soviets go in the de-Stalinization process, particularly in the ideological/doctrinal field? In this connection, what is your interpretation of the recent Pravda attack on "rotten elements" in the Party allegedly abusing their right to criticize?
- b) Which elements of Stalin's foreign policy may be repudiated in order to increase the appeal and effectiveness of the current Soviet diplomatic and trade offensive? Can such elements be isolated through analysis of probable advantages and disadvantages involved in their repudiation, and which elements would be more likely than others to come under fire?
- c) What problems and vulnerabilities are the Satellite leaders facing in connection with the rehabilitation of purge victims? What is your view on the equivocal position of CP Czechoslovakia in connection with Slansky? How do you view the apparent conflict between the rehabilitation of Jews in Poland and the Slansky verdict on his tie-up with "Zionists" which appears to be still on the books?
- d) Why is there a diversity in the pattern of Bloc CP reaction? (The spectrum ranges from Ulbricht's all-out attack to the balanced position of CP China. The contrast between the sharp reaction of CP Poland and the milder treatment by CP Rumania is obvious.) Do these diversified reactions reflect views of possible factions in the USSR, or do they indicate that the Bloc CPs have been permitted to adjust their reactions to their local needs? Specifically, how does the Stalin purge affect CPSU/CP China relations?
- e) What is the actual new status of the Soviet military with respect to the conduct of Soviet officers? What is Zhukov's relation to and influence with the Soviet Party?

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- f) How serious are the readjustment problems of Communist Parties outside the Bloc? What are the special regional problems in Western Europe, Far East, Middle East? Which Communist Parties are likely to suffer greater ideological and leadership dislocation than others? Which Parties are likely to increase their appeal as "national" movements.
- g) What patterns of rationalization are developing in the International Communist Movement, and how vulnerable are these patterns? It appears to us that the line in defense of the current Soviet collective to the effect that they could not have opposed Stalin without causing a split in the CPSU is particularly weak.

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